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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALE KURT ROTHE, 
Defendant-Appellant 
vs. 
JODY ROTHE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Category: 
Ccise No. 880018-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over 
this domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(g). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final ord^r on the Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce entered into the records of the 
Court on the 17th day of December, 1987. The Honorable 
Judge George E. Ballif amended the Decree of Divorce entered 
previously on October 24, 1980 regarding health insurance, 
visitation, child support, the obligation of plaintiff to 
pay the mortgage oh the marital home^ and attorneys fees. 
It is from the Court's decision regarding the satisfaction 
of the mortgage obligation for which defendant-appellant 
appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the tri(al court err in finding that the debt to 
defendant-appellant's parents did not constitute a legal or 
equitable mortgage? 
II. Did the trial court err in ruling that there was 
insufficient evidence to hold plaintiff-respondent liable on 
the debt when both parties acknowledged the debt, and 
plaintiff-respondent had partially performed paying thereon? 
III. Was the trial court's finding that plaintiff-
respondent thought there was no other obligation on the home 
besides the Veterans Administration mortgage against the 
weight of evidence? 
IV. Did the tibial court err in failing to find that 
the term "mortgage" was a diction error of both plaintiff-
respondent and her attorney pursuant to a "no contest" 
divorce in which defendant was unrepresented by counsel? 
V. Did the trial court err in not finding a mutual 
mistake as to both parties' belief that the debt owing to 
defendant-appellant'is parents was a mortgage and thus 
reforming the decree of divorce to reflect the parties' 
intent that plaintifjf-respondent be responsible for the debt 
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regardless of the us,e of the term "mortgage" to describe the 
debt? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-5(3): 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support 
and maintenance of the parites, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, 
and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-6: 
Every conveyance of real estate, and every 
instrument of ,writing setting forth an agreement 
to convey any jreal estate or whereby any real 
estate may be affected, to operate as notice to 
third persons s(hall be proved or acknowledged and 
certified in the manner prescribed by this title 
and recorded in) the office of the recorder of the 
county in which such real estate is situated, but 
shall be valid and binding between the parties 
thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, 
certification Jor record, and as to all other 
persons who have had actual notice. Neither the 
fact that an1 instrument recorded as herein 
provided, recites only a nominal consideration, 
nor the fact that the grantee in such instrument 
is designated jas trustee, or that the conveyance 
otherwise purports to be in trust without naming 
the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the 
trust, shall op'erate to charge any third person 
with notice o,f the interest of any person or 
persons not named in such instrument or of the 
grantor or grantors; but the grantee may convey 
the fee or sucfy lesser interest as was conveyed to 
him by such Instrument free and clear of all 
claims not dis,closed by the instrument or by an 
instrument recjorded as herein provided setting 
forth the name,s of the beneficiaries, specifying 
the interest claimed and describing the property 
charged with such interest. 
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Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-14: 
(here insert name), mortgagor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby 
mortgages to (insert name), mortgagee, 
of (insert place of residence), for the sum 
of doll'ars, the following described tract 
of landj in County, Utah, to wit: 
(here describe the premises). 
This mortgage is given to secure the following 
indebtedness (here state amount and form of 
indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and 
to whom payable and where). 
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and 
assessments on said premises, and the sum of 
dollars attorneys1 fees in case of 
foreclosure* 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this day 
of , 19 . 
Such mortgage as executed by law shall have the 
effect of a conveyance of the land therein 
described, together with all the rights, 
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal 
representatives, as security for the payment of 
the indebtedness thereon set forth, with covenants 
from the mortgagor of general warranty of title, 
and that all taxes and assessments levied and 
assessed upon the land described, during the 
continuance of the mortgage, will be paid previous 
to the day appointed for the sale of such lands 
for taxes; and| may be foreclosure as provided by 
law upon any default being made in any of the 
conditions thereof as to the payment of either 
principal, interest, taxes or assessments. 
Utah Code Annotated, §57-3-2: 
1) Every conveyance, or instrument in writing 
affected real estate, executed, acknowledged, or 
proved, and cerjtified, in the manner prescribed by 
this title, and every patent to lands within this 
state duly executed and verified according to law, 
and every judgment, order, or decree of any court 
of record in this state, or a copy of it, required 
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by law to be recorded in the office of the county 
recorder, and every financing statement which 
complies with S70A-9-402 shall, from the time of 
filing the same with the recorder for mortgagees, 
and lien holders are deemed to purchase and take 
with notice. 
2) The recording of an instrument as provided 
in Subsection (|l) is not affected to any change in 
an interest rate in accordance with terms of an 
agreement pertaj 
the instrument 
ining to the obligation for which 
Irecorded was given as security. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appe(al from an Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce entered lafter trial on plaintiff-respondent's 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and defendant-
appellant's Counter-petition to Modify Decree of Divorce in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge George E. Ballif 
presiding. The Coi^ rt modified the Decree of Divorce which 
had been previously entered on the 24th day of October, 1980 
regarding health insurance, visitation, child support, 
plaintiff's liability to pay the mortgage on the parties1 
home, and alimony. In addition, the court ordered 
defendant-appellant to pay to plaintiff-respondent $450 in 
attorneys fees. It is from the decision of the court 
regarding plaintif f|-respondent's obligation to make the 
mortgage payment on the parties' home that defendant-
appellant appeals. 
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B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The original complaint for divorce in this matter was 
filed by plaintif f|-respondent on July 17, 1980. The 
complaint for divoirce specified in paragraph 11 that 
plaintiff-respondent, was to assume and be responsible for 
the mortgage due and owing on the home of the parties. (R. 
2) 
On the same day of filing the complaint, plaintiff-
respondent also filled an Appearance, Consent and Waiver 
signed by defendant-appellant in which defendant-appellant 
acknowledged that he understood the complaint and that he 
agreed to the contents thereof. (R. 5) 
Subsequently, ion October 24, 1980, the court entered 
its Findings of Faqt, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce between the parties. (R. 11-17) Both documents were 
drafted by plaintiff-respondent's attorney. Both documents 
also contained a pro.Vision requiring plaintiff-respondent to 
assume and be responsible for the mortgage due and owing on 
the home of the parties. (R. 16) 
Defendant-appellant filed a Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce on or abo,ut August 21, 1986, in which he alleged 
that plaintiff-respojndent had not been satisfying the debt 
due and owing to Jiis parents for the purchase of the 
parties1 home and requested the court to order her to do the 
same. (R. 19-21) ([Defendant-appellant also requested the 
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court to specificaljly define his visitation rights, reduce 
child support, and tb allow him to list ^11 of his children 
as beneficiaries on his life insurance policy. Defendant-
appellant does not s(eek appeal on those issues.) 
Plaintif f-respo|ndent filed a counter-petition to modify 
decree of divorce regarding visitation, child support, 
health insurance and alleging that s^nce the Decree of 
Divorce, defendant-lappellant had quit claimed all right, 
title and interest he had in the home aijid real property to 
the plaintiff-respondent, and therefore plaintiff-respondent 
was entitled to have paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce 
nullified. (R. 24-218) 
C. DISPOSITION OF COURT BELOW. 
Pursuant to order of the court (R. 95) the parties 
submitted their proposed Proffers and Findings of Fact to 
the Court arguing their respective po$itions. (R. 97-155) 
Subsequently, on the 15th day of Jun^, 1987, Howard H. 
Maetani, Domestic Relations Commissioner, entered his 
Recommendation in wh|ich he adopted paragraph 9 of plaintiff-
respondent's proposed Findings of Fapt, which stated as 
follows: 
The court makes no order as it relates to the 
moneys owing to defendant's parents. If any 
moneys are in fact due and owing, the defendant's 
parents have tjhe obligation of enforcing any such 
right against persons who a court of competent 
jurisdiction majy determine to be responsible. (R. 
156-157) 
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An objection t,o the Domestic Relations Commissioner's 
Recommendation was filed June 26, 1987, in which defendant-
appellant objectedi to the recommendation of the 
Commissioner regarding, the debt due and owing to his 
parents, the Commissioner's failure to reduce child support, 
and the Commissioner's ruling regarding life insurance. (R. 
158-159) 
A hearing on djefendant-appellant's objection was held 
before the Honorable Judge George E. Ballif of the Fourth 
Judicial District Co,lirt on the 16th day of December, 1987. 
The Honorable Judge Ballif subsequently entered his ruling 
on the 17th day of Djecember, 1987 as follows: 
1. That the agreement of October, 1974, was not a 
mortgage in that it does not describe land to 
which it would apply, nor does it contain any 
provisions relative to rights, obligations and 
procedures for foreclosing the same and was not 
recorded. 
2. That the Decree of Divorce's mention of 
"mortgage" without any other reference to the 
specific obligation claimed to be a mortgage in 
favor of a thir(d party, and not of record, would 
be insufficient to establish liability to 
plaintiff to pay and discharge that debt. (R. 
199-202) 
Defendant-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on the 
13th day of January, 1988. (R. 186-187) 
D. STATEMENT QF FACTS. 
Prior to defend'ant-appellant's marriage to plaintiff-
respondent, defendant-appellant purchased a home and real 
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property located at 415 East 900 North, Ijehi, Utah. (R. 130) 
In order to purchase the home, defendant-appellant assumed 
an existing V.A. mortgage of $6,818.59, and borrowed the 
remaining $31,484.0|4 from his father. Said purchase was 
consummated in October, 1974. (R. 145-14^) 
Plaintiff-respondent and defendant-appellant were 
married several months later on July 25, 1975. (R. 1) 
During the course of the marriage, both parties would 
acquire money orders for payment of the obligation to the 
Veterans Administrateon and to defendant-appellantfs parents 
for satisfaction of the obligations on the home. (R. 239) A 
Release of Mortgage was delivered to the parties by the 
Veterans Administration on or about the 21st day of 
September, 1979 (R. 148 and 224). 
The Decree of D,ivorce in this matter was originally 
signed by Judge George E. Ballif of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court on the 24th day of October, 1980. In that 
decree, plaintiff-respondent was awarded possession of the 
home and real property of the parties located at 415 East 
900 North, Lehi, Utah. Plaintiff-respondent was also 
ordered to "assume afnd be responsible for the mortgage due 
and owing upon the home of the parties". (R. 15-17) The 
divorce papers were drafted by plaintiff-respondent's 
attorney, and the diyorce was granted pursuant to defendant-
appellant's default!—defendant-appellant havina sianed an 
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Appearance, Consent and Waiver. (R. 5) 
At the time ,of the decree of divorce, the only 
obligation due and| owing on the parties home was an 
unrecorded handwritten note between defendant-appellant and 
his father, Fon Rothe, on October 18, 1974, that required 
defendant-appellant to pay his father as follows: 
Dale Rothe agrjees to pay $150.00 a month on the 
house loan of $38,302.63 minus the Veterans 
Administration loan of $6,818.59 plus the 
interest I will have to pay to Bank of America— 
signed Fon K. I^ othe and Dale K. Rothe. 
Defendant-appel|lant ?s parents had loaned the money to 
the parties to use to purchase the home and real property 
located at 415 East 900 North, Lehi, Utah. Prior to their 
divorce, both plain(tiff-respondent and defendant-appellant 
were faithful in pay|ing to defendant-appellant's parents the 
$150.00 a month due and owing on the loan which had been 
extended to defendant-appellant prior to his marriage to 
plaintiff-respondent for purchase of the residence. In 
addition, after the ,entry of the decree of divorce, and with 
the consent of plaintiff-respondent, defendant-appellant 
paid the house payment for a period of 38 months for 
plaintiff-respondent out of the $220.00 in alimony that he 
owed her each morxey, and would send plaintiff-respondent 
the remaining $70.00|. (R. 226) 
On August 27, 1981, defendant-appellant quit claimed 
his interest in the home and real property to plaintiff-
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respondent at the urging of plaintiff-respondent who said 
that her and the children had nothing. (R. 225) However, 
plaintiff-respondent continued to |pay to defendant-
appellant's parents the $150.00 a month obligation until 
plaintiff-respondent remarried in Octobelr of 1982, at which 
time she made at least an additional payment on the debt 
owing to defendant-appellant's parents ajnd then discontinued 
payment all together. 
At the hearing before the Honorlable Judge George E. 
Ballif on December 16, 1987, plaintiff-irespondent testified 
that at the time of the decree of divorce she thought the 
obligation owing to defendant-appellant's parents was a 
mortgage and acknowledged that she understood that they had 
a note on the home,. (R. 246) Howevelr, on advice of her 
attorney, she discontinued payment of thie obligation because 
she had been counseled since it was not in fact a legal 
mortgage, she was not obligated to satisfy the same. (R. 
242) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although the handwritten note between defendant-
appellant and his father, Fon Rothe, did not fulfill the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated 57-1-14 in that: "it 
does not describe land to which it would apply, nor does it 
contain any provisions relative to the rights, obligations 
and procedures for foreclosing the same", (R. 183, 184) nor 
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did it fill the requirements of 57-1-6 Utah Code Annotated 
in that it was not recorded, the trial court should have 
found that a mortgage still existed. It is clear the 
handwritten note between defendant-appellant and his father 
do not constitute a legal mortgage pursuant to statute; 
however, the court should have properly found that an 
equitable mortgage existed. 
55 Am.Jur.2d, Mortgages, §12, P. 201-202 states as 
follows: 
Under the maximi, equity regards that as done which 
ought to be done, an agreement to secure an 
obligation by a mortgage is generally regarded as 
operating as anj equitable mortgage. This is true 
where real estate is acquired with money loaned 
for the purchase, under a promise that the lender 
is to receive a mortgage.... 
The evidence is uncontroverted that in October of 1974, 
defendant-appellant, prior to his marriage to plaintiff-
respondent, purchased a home and real property located at 
415 East 900 North, Lehi, Utah. (R. 223 & 224) In order to 
purchase the home, defendant-appellant assumed an existing 
V.A. mortgage of $6,818.59, and borrowed the remaining 
$31,484.04 from his father. Defendant-appellant and his 
father entered into a handwritten note which states as 
follows: 
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the 
house loan of $38,302.63 minus the Veterans 
Administration loan of $6,818.59 plus the 
interest I will have to pay to Bank of America— 
signed Fon K. Rothe and Dale K. Rothe. (R. 145 & 
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253) 
It is clear firom the record that even though the 
handwritten note between defendant-appellant and his father 
do not constitute a legal mortgage in the statutory sense, 
the parties did ihtend the home to be security for the 
payment of the purchase money loaded by defendant-
appellant's father to defendant-appellant by use of the term 
"house loan" (R. 14 5) and by virtue of defendant-
appellant's testimony (R. 223). 
The trial court also erred in ruling that there was 
insufficient evidence to hold plaintiff-despondent liable on 
the debt owing to defendant-appellant<s parents when both 
parties acknowledged the debt, and plaintiff-respondent had 
partially performed paying thereon. In fact, plaintiff-
respondent authorized defendant-appellant to make the 
$150.00 a month payment to defendant-appellant's parents by 
withholding the same from plaintiff-respondent's alimony. 
(R. 225 & 241) Indeed, plaintif f-respoifident indicated that 
the reason she was paying defendant-appellant's parents is 
because there was a note on the home whi<?h she thought was a 
mortgage. (R. 246) 
Indeed, because plaintiff-respondent admitted she was 
aware of the obligation due and owing to defendant-
appellant's parents, and she further thought said obligation 
was a mortgage, the court's finding th£t plaintiff thought 
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there was no other obligation on the home besides the 
Veterans Administration mortgage was clearly against the 
weight of evidence,. Plaintiff-respondent admitted on 
several occasions she was aware of two obligations on the 
home during the course of the marriage: one to the Veterans 
Administration and the other to defendant-appellant's 
parents. (R. 245, 24!6) 
Since both parties clearly indicated they thought the 
obligation owing to defendant-appellant's parents was in 
fact a mortgage, the trial court erred in failing to find 
the term "mortgage" was a diction error of both plaintiff-
respondent and her attorney pursuant to a no-contest divorce 
in which defendant-appellant was unrepresented by counsel. 
It was plaintiff-respondent and her attorney who selected 
the language and incorporated the same into the decree of 
divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is 
ludicrous to assume plaintiff-respondent may simply relieve 
herself of a financial responsibility which she agreed to 
assume pursuant to the decree of divorce simply because the 
obligation owing to defendant-appellant's parents did not 
constitute a legal statutory mortgage. In fact, selecting 
the term "mortgage",, plaintiff-respondent was charged with 
knowledge of what l^ Lens were of record against the property 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-6. An investigation 
by plaintiff-respondent and her attorney would have shown 
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there were no recorded mortgages against the property at the 
time of the decre,e of divorce. Consequently, the only 
obligation owing on the property woulc| be that owing to 
defendant-appellant f,s parents, which, although was 
unrecorded, plaintiff-respondent admitted she had specific 
knowledge of the same. (R. 246) 
As a result, the trial court erred in not finding a 
mutual mistake as to both parties1 belief the debt owing to 
defendant-appellant f!s parents was a mortgage and thus 
reforming the decree of divorce to reflect the parties' 
intent that plaintiflf-respondent be responsible for the debt 
regardless of the use of the term "mortgage" to describe the 
debt. It is clear from the record ^either party clearly 
understood the legal requirements flor creation of a 
"mortgage" pursuant to Utah statute. (See R. 230 in which 
defendant-appellant testifies mortgage means you owe 
somebody money, and R. 245 wherein plaintiff-respondent 
indicates she does not understand what an unsecured 
obligation is, and R. 246 in which plaintiff-respondent 
defines mortgage as fahat was owing on the home.) 
Nevertheless, there is no dispute plaintiff-respondent 
agreed to satisfy the obligation on the home. It was an 
error on the part of the trial court %o relieve plaintiff-
respondent of her court-ordered and stipulated 
responsibility simply because the obligation to defendant-
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appellant's parents does not constitute a legal mortgage. 
The trial court should have reformed the decree of divorce 
to reflect the understanding of the parties that plaintiff-
respondent would be responsible to satisfy the loan from 
defendant-appellant's parents, which was acquired for the 
purchase of the home.. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEBT TO 
DEFENDANT-APPEllLANT'S PARENTS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
LEGAL OR EQUITABLE MORTGAGE, 
Section 57-1-1,4, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), as 
amended, sets for th,e statutory form for creation of a legal 
mortgage as follows: 
(here insert name) , mortgagor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby 
mortgages to (insert name), mortgagee, 
of (insejrt place of residence), for the sum 
of ~ dollars, the following described tract 
of land in County, Utah, to wit: 
(here describe the premises). 
This mortgage is given to secure the following 
indebtedness (here state amount and form of 
indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and 
to whom payable and where). 
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and 
assessments on said premises, and the sum of 
dollarfe attorneys1 fees in case of 
foreclosure. 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this day 
of , 19 . 
Such mortgage as executed by law shall have the 
effect of a conveyance of the land therein 
described, together with all the rights, 
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
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to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal 
representatives!, as security for the payment of 
the indebtedness thereon set forth/ with covenants 
from the mortgagor of general warranty of title, 
and that all taxes and assessments levied and 
assessed upon the land described, during the 
continuance of jthe mortgage, will be paid previous 
to the day appointed for the sale of such lands 
for taxes; and! may be foreclosure as provided by 
law upon any default being made in any of the 
conditions thereof as to the pdyment of either 
principal, interest, taxes or assessments. 
The handwritten agreement between defendant-appellant and 
his father dated October 18, 1974 reads as follows: 
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the 
house loan of $38,302.63 minu^ the Veterans 
Administration loan of $6,818.59 plus the 
interest I will have to pay to Bar^ k of America— 
signed Fon K. Rothe and Dale K. Rothe. (R. 183, 
145) 
The Court, having reviewed the note and the statutory 
requirements for a mortgage, concluded as follows: 
The court concludes that the agreement dated 
October of 1974i is not a mortgage since it does 
not describe land to which it would apply, nor 
does it contain any provisions relative to rights, 
obligations and procedures for foreclosing the 
same, and was not recorded. (R. 1^ 3 & 184) 
Although it is true that the handwritten agreement 
between defendant-appellant and his father did not fulfill 
the legal requirements of Utah Code Annotated §57-1-14, the 
trial court erred in its decision that no valid mortgage 
existed. The court should have found that the agreement 
between defendant-appellant and his father constituted an 
equitable mortgage against the home and real property 
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located at 415 East 900 North, Lehi, Utah. 
55 Am.Jur. 2d, Mortgages, §12, P. 201-202 states as 
follows: 
Under the maxim1, equity regards that as done which 
ought to be done, an agreement to secure an 
obligation by a mortgage is generally regarded as 
operating as an equitable mortgage. This is true 
where real estate is acquired with money loaned 
for the purchase, under a promise that the lender 
is to receive a mortgage.... 
Indeed, an equitable lien is created upon the property 
"which is enforceable against the property in the hands of 
not only the original contractor, but of his...purchasers or 
encumbrancers with notice." 4 Pomeroy, Eguitv Jurisprudence, 
§12 35. Thus an agreement that particular property "is 
security for a debt also gives rise to an equitable mortgage 
even though it does not constitute a legal mortgage. (Coast 
Bay v. Minderhout. 38 Cal.Rptr 505, 392 P.2d 265 (1964), 
Benton v. Benton, 528 P.2d 1244 (Kan. 1974), Hill v. Hill. 
185 Kansas 389, 345 P.2d 1015) The theory of equitable 
mortgage has been recognized in the State of Utah. See 
Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah, 1984), Baker v. 
Taggart, 628 P.2d 1283 (1981), Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 
186 (1976). 
Defendant-appellant purchased the home and real 
property located at 415 East 900 North, Lehi, Utah prior to 
his marriage to plaintiff-respondent. In order to purchase 
the home, defendant-appellant assumed an existing Veterans 
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Administration mortgage with a balance of $6,818.59, and 
borrowed the remaining $31,484.04 from his father, Fon 
Rothe. (See copies of cancelled checks R. 146) Pursuant to 
defendant-appellant'is promise to pay his father back the 
money that was loaned to him to purchase the home, 
defendant-respondent and his father executed the handwritten 
note cited above. 
It is clear from the note that defendant-appellant and 
his father intended to create an obligation against the home 
by executing said note. The money was loan to defendant-
appellant as purchase money for the home and real property 
located at 415 East 900 North, Lehi, Utah. Indeed, the 
language of the note itself indicates that Dale Rothe agrees 
to pay "$150 a month on the house loan of $38,302.63". The 
selection of the word "house loan" clearly indicates an 
intention on the parlt of defendant-appellant and his father, 
Fon Rothe, to create a mortgage. After having executed the 
note, it is clear from the record of defendant-appellant's 
testimony that he intended, or at least believed, that the 
note constituted a Valid mortgage on his property on behalf 
of his father. (R. 223 & 230) Specific mention of a 
security interest is unnecessary if it otherwise appears 
that the parties intended to create such an interest. Coast 
Bay v. Minderhout, 38 Cal.Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265 (1964). 
The evidence is uncohtroverted that defendant-appellant and 
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his father, Fon Rothe intended to create a mortgage on the 
subject property. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO HOLD PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT LIABLE ON THE DEBT OWING TO DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT'S PARENTS WHEN BOTH PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGED 
THE DEBT, AND PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HAD PARTIALLY 
PERFORMED PAYING THEREON. 
The decree of divorce specifically states that 
plaintiff-respondent is to "assume and be responsible for 
the mortgage due and owing upon the home of the parties...." 
(R. 16) At the time of the entry of the decree of divorce, 
there was only one obligation due and owing on the home, 
which was awarded to plaintiff-respondent, to wit: the 
handwritten note between Dale Rothe and his father, Fon 
Rothe• 
In order to purchase the home, defendant-appellant 
assumed an existing ^.A. mortgage of $6,818.59, and borrowed 
the remaining $31,484.04 from his father. The $6,818.59, 
which was left owing to the Veterans Administration was paid 
off and a release of mortgage was executed on September 21, 
1979. (R. 148) Wherefore, at the time of the divorce decree 
in October of 1980, there was only one obligation existing 
on the home, and that was the obligation existing to 
defendant-appellant's parents. 
After the decree of divorce, and with plaintiff-
respondentfs permission, defendant-appellant withheld the 
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monthly payment of $150•00 from plaintiff-respondent's 
alimony and paid the same directly to defendant-respondent's 
parents in order to fulfill the obligation on said home. 
(R. 225, 240 & 241) Approximately 38 payments were made by 
plaintiff-respondent in this matter. In addition, 
plaintiff-respondent acknowledged that she knew there was a 
note on the home held by defendant-respdndent's parents and 
that she too believed said note was a mortgage. (R. 246) 
These facts, together with those set ^orth in defendant-
appellant's arguments below, clearly show plaintiff-
respondent was aware of the debt to defendant-appellant's 
parents, had voluntarily assumed to pay the same and had 
partially performed thereon. 
III. THE TRIAIi COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT THOUGHT THERE WAS NO OTHER OBLIGATION 
ON THE HOME BESIDES THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION 
MORTGAGE WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 
In equity cases, the appellate coi^ rt can review facts 
as well as law and may reverse the lower court's finding if 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court's 
decision. McBride v. McBridef 581 P.2d 996 (Utah, 1978); 
Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah, ^.978); Provo City v. 
Lambert, 574 P. 2d 72|7 (Utah, 1978); Hatch v. Bastian, 567 
P.2d 1100 (Utah, 19,77) ; Richards v. Pine Ranch, Inc., 559 
P.2d 948 (Utah, 1977). Consequently, since this court is 
one in equity, this court is not bound to recognize the 
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trial court's findings if contrary to evidence. 
The findings of the Honorable Judge George E. Ballif 
state in paragraph 1|5 as follows: 
There is no evidence to support any knowledge on 
the part of the plaintiff of an obligation against 
the home other than the V.A. mortgage which she 
assumed was still in force, although actually 
released some months prior to the filing of the 
complaint for dlivorce. (R. 194 & 184) 
The Honorable Judge Balliffs finding is in direct 
contradiction to the testimony given by plaintiff-respondent 
on direct examination by her attorney: 
Question: Will you tell the court as best as you 
can what you understood the reason why 
you Were paying Dale's parents the 
payments on the home? 
Answer: Well, I thought it was because they had 
Well, I knew there 
I thought it was a 
a note on the home. 
was 'a note, but 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
loan to the parents 
a mortgage on the 
mortgage. 
So you thought the 
was, in fact, 
property? 
Right. 
And so you know the money was paid, over 
the course of the marriage, there was 
money! paid to Dale's parents and to the 
V.A.? 
Answer: Right. (R. 246) 
Paragraph 10 of the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law states as follows: 
The court finds that the home was purchased by the 
parties in 1974, and that there had been a 
recorded mortgage in favor of the Veterans 
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Administration against the home dt that time and 
the parties both testified they were aware of the 
payments being made on the mortgage out of their 
joint funds. In September of 1979, the Veterans 
Administration mortgage was released without the 
knowledge of plaintiff, the decree of divorce was 
entered on October 24, 1980. ((emphasis added) 
(R. 192) 
However, despite the finding qf the court, 
plaintiff-respondent testified on dirtect examination 
defendant-respondent!1 s attorney as follows: 
Question: And when you first marrfied Mr. Rothe, 
was their an obligation on the home in 
Lehi? 
Answer: Yes. 
Quest ion: To th,e Ve te rans , a V.A. rtortgage? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: And what lending institution was holding 
that tnortgage? Do you recall? 
Answer: What is that? 
Question: What bank did you pay? 
Answer: I don't know. 
Question: How did you make the payment on a 
regular basis? 
Answer: With a money order. 
Question: Whose responsibility w^s that in the 
household in the scheme qf things? 
Answer: It just depended. Sometimes I would pay 
it and sometimes he woula pay it. 
Question: How much was it a month, do you recall? 
Answer: I doni't know; I c a n ' t reitiember. 
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Question: Do you recall when it was satisfied? 
Answer: I can't remember. 
Question: Do you have any quarrel with the release 
of mortgage in the court file which 
indicates that it was satisfied in 
September of 1979? 
Answer: If that's what it says. I don't 
remember when it was paid off. (R. 
239) 
From the record, it is clear that plaintiff-respondent 
"simply did not remember" when the Veterans Administration 
mortgage was paid off. There is no indication whatsoever in 
the record that the release of the mortgage by the Veterans 
Administration in September of 1979 was without the 
knowledge of plaintiiff-respondent. 
Section 57-3-2 Utah Code Annotated (1985) as amended, 
states as follows: 
Every conveyance, or instrument in writing 
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or 
proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed by 
this title, and| every patent to lands within this 
state duly executed and verified according to law, 
and every judgment, order, or decree of any court 
of record in this state, or a copy of it, required 
by law to be recorded in the office of the county 
recorder, and i every financing statement which 
complies with §;70a-9-402 shall, from the time of 
filing the sam!e with the recorder for record, in 
part notice toj all persons of their contents. 
Subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and lien 
holders are deemed to purchase and take with 
notice, (emphasis added) 
Consequently,
 swhen plaintiff-respondent undertook to 
deal with the real property, to wit: the parties home in 
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Lehi, she was charged with the knowledge of what was shown 
by the records of the county recorder in Utah County• See 
Crompton v, Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931). Indeed, 
plaintiff-respondent took the land with "constructive 
notice11 of what had been filed on the records of the Utah 
County Recorder's office. By researching said records, 
plaintiff-respondent would have seen that the release of 
mortgage on the Veterans Administration loan had been duly 
executed on September 21, 1979. Consequently, the only 
obligation owing on the property would be that owing to 
defendant-appellant's parents, which, although was 
unrecorded, plaintiff-respondent admitted that she had 
specific knowledge of the same. (R. 246) 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE TERM "MORTGAGE" WAS A DICTION ERROR OF BOTH 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT AND HER ATTORNEY PURSUANT TO 
A "NO CONTEST" DIVORCE IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS 
UNREPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 
The original complaint for divorqe in this matter was 
filed by Plaintiff-Respondent on July 17, 1980. (R. 1) 
The complaint for divorce specified in paragraph 11 that 
Plaintiff-Respondent was to assume and be responsible for 
the mortgage due and owing in the home of the parties (R. 
2) On the same day of filing the complaint Plaintiff-
Respondent also filled an Appearance, Consent and Waiver 
signed by Defendant-Appellant in which Defendant-Appellant 
acknowledged that he understood the complaint and that he 
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agreed to the contents thereof. (R. 5) 
Subsequently, on October 24, 1980, the Court enter its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
between the parties. (Records 11 through 17.) Both 
documents were drafted by Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney 
and Paragraph 9 of the Decree of Divorce reads as follows: 
"The Plaintiff is to assume and be responsible for the 
mortgage due and owing on the home of the parties and the 
obligation due and owing upon the automobile..." (R. 16) 
Prior to their divorce, Plaintiff-Respondent and 
Defendant-Appellant were faithful in paying to Defendant-
Appellant's parents the $150.00 per month due and owing on 
the home which had been extended for the purchase of the 
home and real property located at 415 East 900 North, Lehi, 
Utah. (R. 224 & 246) 
Section 30-3-5(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, As 
Amended) allows the trial court to have continuing 
jurisdiction to "make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the support maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental 
care, or the distribution of the property as is reasonable 
and necessary." However, "equity is not available to 
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away 
simply because one party has come to regret the bargain 
made." Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah, 1980). 
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Consequently, if the parties select an ambiguous term in 
drafting divorce documents, the Court must construe the 
ambiguity to determine what was contemplated by the parties 
at the time said documents were drafted. Land v. Land, 605 
P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah, 1980). 
In the case of Rollo v. Rollo, 661 P.2d 962 (Utah, 
1983) the Utah Supreme Court reversed a lower courtfs 
decision in interpretation of a decree of divorce in which 
the former wife sued for specific performance of the decree 
which obligated the former husband to pay one-half of a loan 
from his grandmother secured by a second mortgage executed 
by the parties on their house. The decree of divorce in 
that case stated as follows: "To thq plaintiff... 2. The 
homestead located at 3 36 West Sunbow." The trial court 
refused to order said reimbursement and in doing so cited 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2 3-4 regarding the statutory 
declaration of homestead rights. In reversing said 
decision, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
In refusing to order such reimbursement, the 
trial court attached unwarranted meaning to the 
word 'homestead1 in the description of what was 
awarded in the decree. The court said 'homestead' 
meant only the equitable, statutory right to 
secure the 'homestead1 amounts stated in the 
statute incident to a sale on execution to satisfy 
creditors. The record is devoid of any fact or 
document or statement that would support such a 
interpretation. The language of the award says 
nothing about a statutory 'homestead' right..." 
(Rollo, supra., at 963). 
Both parties clearly indicated that they thought the 
27 
obligation owing tt> Defendant-Appellant's parents was in 
fact a mortgage. (R. 224 246) Indeed, after the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce and with the consent of Plaintiff-
Respondent, Defendant-Appellant paid the house payment for a 
period of 38 months for Plaintiff-Respondent out of the 
$220.00 in alimony that he owed her each month, and would 
send Plaintiff-Respondent the remaining $70.00. (R.226) 
This arrangement continued until after Defendant-Appellant 
had delivered to Plaintiff-Respondent a quit claim deed 
giving his interest in the property to her. After receiving 
Defendant-Appellant's interest in the property, Plaintiff-
Respondent attempted to take a second mortgage out on the 
property. At that time, Plaintiff-Respondent became aware 
that there was no recorded mortgage against the property. 
Consequently, Plaintiff-Respondent took the position that if 
there was no recorded mortgage on the property, she was not 
going to pay the obligation as agreed to pursuant to the 
Decree of Divorce (R. 246 & 247). 
It is ludicrous to assume that Plaintiff-Respondent may 
simply relieve herself of the financial responsibility which 
she agreed to assume pursuant to the Decree of Divorce 
simply because the obligation owing to Defendant-Appellant's 
parents did not constitute a legal statutory mortgage. 
Indeed, Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledged that she knew that 
there was a note against the home, which she believed was 
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the mortgage at the time of the Decree of Divorce as set 
forth to her following testimony: 
Well, I thought it was because they had a 
note on the home. Well, I knew there was a note, 
but I thought it was a mortgage. (Record 246.) 
Indeed, by sanctioning Plaintiff-Respondent's wrongful 
actions, the Court has allowed her to perpetrate a manifest 
injustice upon Defendant-Appellant. Indeed, in reliance 
upon Plaintiff-Respondent paying off the obligation to his 
parents, Defendant-Appellant quit-claimed his interest in 
the property to Plaintiff-Respondent. Then, after having 
done so, Plaintiff-Respondent informs Defendant-Appellant 
that she is not going to pay to Defendant-Respondent's 
parents the monthly mortgage obligation. Plaintiff-
Respondent has left Defendant-Appellant in a position where 
he must satisfy the same to his parents, event though he no 
longer has an interest in the home. 
V, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING A MUTUAL 
MISTAKE AS TO BOTH PARTIES' BELIEF AS TO THE DEBT 
OWING TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S PARENTS WAS A 
MORTGAGE AND THUS REFORMING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
TO REFLECT THE PARTIES1 INTENT THAT PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEBT REGARDLESS 
OF THE TERM "MORTGAGE" TO DESCRIBE THE DEBT, 
In the case of Kier v. Condrack, 478 P.2d 327 (Utah, 
1970), the Utah Supreme Court states as follows: 
We recognize that the validity of the rule relied 
upon by the defendants that to be enforceable a 
contract must be sufficiently definite in its 
terms that the parties know what is required of 
them. But like all rules, which are necessarily 
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stated in generality, it is only applicable in the 
proper circumstances, where the justice of the 
case requires: as a shield to protect a party from 
an injustice, and not as a weapon with which to 
perpetrate an injustice. 
The record is clear that plaintiff-respondent knew that 
defendant-appellant's parents had loaned money to defendant-
appellant to purchase the home, was aware there was a note, 
and thought said note was a mortgage. (R. 246) It is also 
undisputed that plaintiff-respondent allowed $150.00 a month 
to be withheld from her alimony payment from defendant-
appellant in order to satisfy the same for a period of 38 
months. (R. 226) By allowing plaintiff-respondent to 
relieve herself of the obligation simply because the note 
between defendant-appellant and his parents did not 
constitute a legal mortgage pursuant to Utah statute is 
allowing plaintiff-respondent to perpetrate a great 
injustice against defendant-appellant. Unless there is no 
meaningful evidence which would be probative, the trial 
court must, where there is an ambiguity, take evidence of 
pertinent circumstances, including the intent of the parties 
at the time of the original divorce for purposes of 
clarifying said ambiguity. LeBreton v. LeBreton, 604 P.2d 
469 (Utah, 1979). 
From the record it is clear that plaintiff-respondent, 
at the time of negotiating the decree of divorce, believed 
that the note due and owing to defendant-respondent's 
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parents was in fact a mortgage. (R. 246) It is also clear 
that plaintiff-respondent did not understand what a 
"unsecured obligation" was. (R.245) There is no question 
from the testimony of plaintiff-respondent that at the time 
of the decree of divorce, plaintiff-respondent believed the 
obligation owing to defendant-appellant's parents was in 
fact a mortgage. (R.I246) 
Defendant-respohdent also believed the obligation due 
and owing to his parents was in fact a mortgage. When asked 
which obligation was due and owing on the home and real 
property of the parties on the 24th day of October, 1980, 
the time of the decree of divorce, defendant-respondent 
testified that the only obligation pn the home was that 
owing to his father. (R. 223) In addition, on cross 
examination by plajintif f-respondent's attorney, defendant-
appellant indicated he did not understand the legal 
significance of Utah statute regarding mortgages pursuant to 
the following testimony: 
Question: Do you know what "mortgage" means? 
Answer: Well, a "mortgage" to me means the same 
thing—I mean, somebody owing some 
moneyl. I mean, you buy an outfit, a 
house}, and you owe the money to them 
until! the money is paid up. You know. 
I mean, that's a mortgage. (R.230) 
Since neither party was aware of the legal statutory 
requirements for creation of a "legal mortgage", they could 
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not have intended that plaintiff-respondent would only 
assume those obligations on the home which were valid legal 
mortgages pursuant to Utah law. Indeed, the evidence is 
clear that both parties believed the obligation due and 
owing to defendant-respondent's parents was in fact a legal 
mortgage, or at least an equitable mortgage, on the 
property. Plaintiff-respondent acknowledged there was an 
obligation due and owing to defendant-appellant's parents on 
the property, authorized payments to be deducted from 
alimony for a period of 38 months. Plaintiff-respondent 
terminated payment when she discovered over 3 years after 
the decree of divorce, after having partially performed 
thereon, and after finally conducting a title search on the 
property that the obligation due and owing to defendant-
respondent's parents was not recorded. It is clear from the 
testimony and actions of the parties that defendant-
appellant and plaintiff-respondent believed the debt owing 
to defendant-appellant's parents was a "mortgage" and thus 
identified the obligation as a mortgage in the Decree of 
Divorce. Since there was a mutual mistake by both parties 
as to the legal status of the obligation to defendant-
respondent's parents at the time of the original decree, the 
decree of divorce should be reformed to reflect the actual 
intent of the parties. 
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CONCLUSION 
The handwritten note between defendant-appellant and 
his father, Fon Rothe, did not fulfill the legal 
requirements of a mortgage pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
§57-1-14. Nevertheless, it is clear from the record the 
note between defendant-appellant and his father did 
constitute an equitable mortgage on the subject property. 
Said "mortgage" was paid by defendant-appellant and 
plaintiff-respondent during the course of their marriage at 
$150.00 per month to defendant-appellant's parents. There 
was sufficient evidence to hold plaintiff-respondent 
responsible for the debt owing to defendant-appellant's 
parents in that plaintiff-respondent admitted on several 
occasions she was aware of two obligations on the home of 
the parties during the course of their marriage, one to the 
Veterans Administration and the other to defendant-
appellant's parents. (R. 245-246) At the time of the 
decree of divorce, the obligation due and owing to the 
Veterans Administration had been satisfied, leaving the only 
obligation on the home the obligation due and owing to 
defendant-appellant's parents. 
Since both parties clearly indicated they thought the 
obligation owing to defendant-appellant's parents was in 
fact a mortgage, the trial court erred in failing to find 
the term "mortgage" was a diction error of both plaintiff-
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respondent and her attorney pursuant to a no contest divorce 
in which defendant-appellant was unrepresented by counsel. 
Since there is no dispute plaintiff-respondent agreed to 
satisfy the obligation on the home, it was an error on the 
part of the court to relieve plaintiff-respondent of her 
court-ordered and stipulated responsibility simply because 
the obligation to defendant-appellant's parents does not 
constitute a legal mortgage, even though said obligation 
could be considered an equitable mortgage pursuant to common 
law. Consequently, the trial court erred in not finding a 
mutual mistake as to both parties' belief the debt owing to 
defendant-appellant's parents was a mortgage, and thus 
reforming the decree of divorce to reflect the parties' 
intent that plaintiff-respondent be responsible for the debt 
regardless of the use of the term "mortgage" to describe the 
debt. 
Defendant-respondent respectfully requests this court 
to reverse the lower court decision and to order that the 
decree of divorce be modified to require plaintiff-
respondent to be responsible for the debt to defendant-
appellant's parents. 
DATED this ^\ day of September, 1988. 
TERRI C. BINGHAM " U 
Attorney for Appellant 
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